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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Recognizing that the “life of the law” is experience, not logic, legal 
academics are increasingly turning their attention to judicial bias 
and other limits on judicial factfinding.1 For Judge Richard Posner, 
“The first thing the courts have to learn is how little they know.”2 
And for Cass Sunstein, “Far more progress might be made through 
an empirically informed constitutional law” than through a jurispru-
dence that is “indifferent” to factual questions.3   
 When it comes to the Supreme Court, difficulties in sorting out 
the underlying facts of a dispute come at a high price. The Supreme 
Court speaks very rarely about the meaning of the Constitution. So 
when it does speak, the Justices must be careful to avoid grounding a 
far-ranging decision on incorrect factual suppositions. For example, 
had the Court’s views on abortion rights turned on the reasons why 
women seek abortions, the Justices could not simply look to the 
plaintiff in Roe v. Wade4 (who, at different times, offered radically dif-
ferent explanations for why she wanted an abortion5). Likewise, 
when reviewing the independent counsel statute in 1988, the Court 
ought not to have assumed that Alexis Morrison’s investigation of 
                                                                                                                    
 * Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and 
Mary. 
 ** Ball Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. An earlier version of this Ar-
ticle was presented to faculty workshops at the Berkeley, Hastings, George Mason, and 
Drake Law Schools. Thanks to the many faculty who offered constructive criticisms and 
suggestions. Thanks also to Greg Mitchell and Jim Rossi for encouraging us to participate 
in this symposium. 
 1. For an inventory of some of this scholarship, see Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the 
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 779-80 (2001). 
 2. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18 (1998). 
 3. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 255 (1999). 
 4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 5. At the time of the decision, the plaintiff in Roe, Norma Nelson McCorvey, claimed 
that she was a rape victim. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 403 (1994). In 1987, she revealed that this 
claim was a fabrication—a lie intended to make her appear more sympathetic. Lisa Belkin, 
Woman Behind the Symbols in Abortion Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1989, at A18. 
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Ted Olson was a prototypical application of the statute.6 For this very 
reason, several Justices steer clear of laying down hard-and-fast 
rules, preferring, instead, to speak narrowly and ambiguously about 
the issue before them.7  
 By offering little concrete guidance about the meaning of the con-
stitutional provision involved, this type of decisionmaking comes at a 
cost. Lacking the purse and the sword, the Court must find ways to 
make itself relevant in the constitutional dialogue that takes place 
between the elected officials and the Court. A Court that speaks 
rarely, and then incoherently, may well render itself inconsequential 
in any dialogue. Elected officials need not reckon with such a Court; 
instead, the political branches can simply spin Court edicts to suit 
their preferred policy or constitutional choices.8 
 The question remains: Is it possible for the Court to issue broad 
pronouncements about the Constitution’s meaning while, at the same 
time, grounding its decisions in the relevant facts? In addressing this 
issue, we will pay particular attention to the Court’s willingness to 
adjudicate disputes that involve plaintiffs with nongeneralizable 
claims, that is, idiosyncratic facts that do not shed sufficient light on 
the competing constitutional values involved. Consider, for example, 
affirmative action. If the claims of a poor, single mother challenging 
an affirmative action plan are fundamentally different than those of 
an upper-middle-class white male, the Court—before issuing a too 
broad or too narrow ruling—must find a way to educate itself about 
how affirmative action works. As we explain, recent advances in be-
havioral economics suggest that human decisionmaking is influenced 
by various cognitive heuristics that bias the decisions in question. 
For instance, there is the “availability heuristic,” which is the ten-
dency to judge the probability of an occurrence according to whether 
                                                                                                                    
 6. Following Lawrence Walsh’s Iran-Contra investigation and Kenneth Starr’s 
Whitewater probe, there is little doubt that the Court, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 
(1988), committed error by wrongly assuming that Department of Justice policies would 
confine independent counsel investigations. See The Future of the Independent Counsel Act: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 243, 251 (1999) 
(statement of Janet Reno, Attorney General) (arguing that the independent counsel statute 
subverts Justice Department enforcement of the criminal laws). 
 7. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at xiii (arguing that, with the exception of Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, and sometimes Chief Justice Rehnquist, today’s Court—aware of the costs 
of “lay[ing] down clear, bright-line rules”—prefers to leave “fundamental questions unde-
cided”). 
 8. On affirmative action, for example, the political branches manipulated the Su-
preme Court’s indeterminate 1995 decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200 (1995). Supporters and opponents of affirmative action pointed to conflicting language 
in the opinion to justify their policy preferences. See Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 
37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673, 712-18 (1996) (detailing political branch spinning of Ada-
rand); Alan J. Meese, Bakke Betrayed, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 479, 489-93 (2000) (de-
tailing Clinton administration manipulation of Bakke). 
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an individual has experienced a similar occurrence personally. More-
over, there is the phenomenon of “anchoring”—essentially, the ten-
dency to overvalue first impressions. By generating doctrine in cases 
that do not present generalizable facts, then, the Court will likely is-
sue decisions that do not reflect a true appreciation of the contending 
interests at stake. 
 What, then, is the Court to do? As noted, narrow, incoherent rul-
ings limit the Court’s voice in shaping constitutional values. How-
ever, if the Justices exercise great caution before deciding nongener-
alizable cases, the Court may fully engage itself in these disputes at 
a time when the “facts” are better known to it and to the nation. Un-
der this proposal, of course, politicians and lower court judges will (at 
least initially) have free reign to decide these issues. But when the 
Supreme Court enters the fray, it will do so at a time when it is bet-
ter positioned both to speak clearly and to make an informed deci-
sion. 
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part II details limits in judicial 
factfinding. Attention will be paid both to biases that stand in the 
way of judges sorting out the facts of a case as well as ways in which 
the attributes of adjudication inevitably result in judges having a 
somewhat distorted view of the relevant facts. Part III makes more 
concrete the claims of Part II. By making use of case studies on af-
firmative action and church-state separation, Part III calls attention 
both to the costs of deciding an issue on the basis of a nongeneraliz-
able set of facts and the prevalence of such nongeneralizable cases. 
Part IV explains why we think the Court ought to embrace delaying 
strategies in cases involving nongeneralizable facts.    
II.   ASSESSING JUDICIAL FACTFINDING 
 Unlike legislatures, which exercise a sort of general jurisdiction, 
courts are limited to adjudicating particular “cases and controver-
sies.”9 In this way, federal court judges are bounded by the factual 
circumstances of the case immediately before them, especially the 
plaintiff’s claim of injury.10 Still, in resolving such disputes, courts 
                                                                                                                    
 9. U.S. CONST. art. III.  
 10. In recent years, some scholars have criticized the Supreme Court for unduly limit-
ing its jurisdiction to resolve constitutional questions. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Stand-
ing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 808 (2004); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The 
Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1992); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s 
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 447 (1994). On the other hand, some scholars see “standing to sue” and other justi-
ciability limits as a necessary means for the Court to protect itself from ideological liti-
gants who seek to shape the path of Supreme Court decisionmaking. See, e.g., MAXWELL L. 
STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT 
DECISION MAKING 157-211 (2000).  
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announce rules that apply beyond the actual litigants and cases be-
fore them. A court cannot very well announce “the plaintiff wins” 
without providing some rationale, and by their nature, rationales ap-
ply beyond the case at hand, at least in lower courts.11 In this way, 
courts act very much like a legislature, announcing rules that apply 
prospectively in a particular set of cases. 
 Still, these rules can be strangely fact-dependent.12 For, as every 
lawyer knows, “the facts” matter; they matter in the sense that they 
can be outcome—and thus rule—determinative. Two cases, indistin-
guishable as a strictly legal matter, can present very different sets of 
facts—facts that shed different lights on the competing interests in-
volved. The right to terminate a pregnancy looks far different if as-
serted by a rape victim than if asserted by a woman unhappy with 
the gender of her soon-to-be-born child.13 Similarly, the right to con-
duct intrastate commerce unmolested by federal regulation looks far 
different when asserted by the operator of a small chicken slaughter-
house than when asserted by a national steel company.14  
 Why, though, do facts matter to the Court’s choice among possible 
binding principles? The most logical answer as to why facts matter is 
“sympathy,” that is, a judge’s personal feeling for one of the litigants 
involved. Correspondingly, even if a judge does not actually feel for a 
certain litigant, the public might. Knowing this, judges might tailor 
their decisions to please the public. 
 Certainly, these factors influence judges, just as they influence 
everyone else. Yet, we think there is an additional reason why facts 
                                                                                                                    
 11. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 72-73 
(1960) (“This rule holds only of redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars. And when 
you find this said of a past case you know that in effect it has been overruled.”). But see 
Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 983 (1987) (contending 
that a decision binds only the parties in the immediate case and “does not establish a su-
preme law of the land”). 
 12. Of course, the application of these rules invariably concerns some type of factfind-
ing. For example, in sorting out whether governmental action that targets gays is subject 
to strict or rational-basis equal protection review, a court’s view of whether sexual orienta-
tion is an immutable characteristic is a legislative fact relevant to the application of a pre-
existing standard of review. See Posner, supra note 2, at 19-22 (suggesting that this in-
quiry is relevant to judicial decisionmaking); David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional 
Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 541, 553 (1991) (describing this type of inquiry as “constitutional-review facts”). 
Likewise, when applying strict review, the Court must find facts (particular to that case) 
about whether the governmental program is the least restrictive means available to serve 
the government’s stated interest. 
 13. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 14. Compare A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 498-51 
(1935) (finding that the activities of a slaughterhouse had an indirect effect on interstate 
commerce), with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-43 (1937) (finding 
that the activities of a national steel company had a direct effect on interstate commerce). 
See also BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 156-64 (1998). 
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matter, a reason that applies to the most hard-hearted and insulated 
jurist. By its nature, constitutional adjudication involves the identifi-
cation and evaluation (we resist the temptation to say “weighing”) of 
competing constitutional and policy interests. Unlike legislators, who 
can investigate and evaluate such interests personally—by holding 
hearings, taking polls, studying their mail, and visiting constitu-
ents—judges are confined to “the record” that is generated as the 
case grinds its way forward. The content of this record, in turn, is 
largely determined by the parties before the Court. Correspondingly, 
judges must operate around “real time” constraints; rather than risk 
a backlog of cases, judges must do what they can with the informa-
tion that they have.15 Thus, because the Court very rarely considers 
cases in which the rule of law is “well-settled,” the Justices’ first im-
pression about the nature and strength of contending interests is de-
termined by the identity, interests, and skill of the parties before the 
Court. Good decisions require significant information, and the Court 
gets most of its information from the parties and the case that hap-
pen to bring the issue to the Justices first.16 
 Litigants are well aware of this phenomenon and invest signifi-
cant resources in identifying sympathetic plaintiffs. In particular, in-
terest groups often see the courts as an “alternate legislature,”17 that 
is, a place to advance their agenda when they are unable to prevail in 
the political process.18 More to the point, when interest groups launch 
a legal challenge, they “are likely to bring not the most representa-
                                                                                                                    
 15. For a more detailed analysis of differences between judicial and legislative fact-
finding, see Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1177-87 (2001). 
 16. Amicus curiae briefs supplement party filings in most cases before the Court. For 
a comprehensive overview of recent trends in amicus filings, see Joseph D. Kearney & 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 743 (2000). 
 17. Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND 
THE JUDICIARY 31, 34 (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987). For Scalia, some in-
terest groups see the Supreme Court as a place which “may enact into law only unques-
tionably good ideas, which, since they are so unquestionably good, must be part of the Con-
stitution.” Id.; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
353, 371-72 (1981) (arguing that the courts should not be an alternative legislature be-
cause “judicial lawmaking” is inconsistent with the policy and process of our electoral sys-
tem) (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 19 (2d ed. 1962). 
 18. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 80-81 (1991) (arguing that judges and legislatures will both be 
subject to interest group pressures); A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Consti-
tution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. 
L. REV. 409, 494-95 (1999) (explaining that some interest groups maximize their interests 
by appealing to judges rather than the legislature). 
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tive case but the most extreme case of discrimination, of fraud, of vio-
lation of statute, of abuse of discretion, and so on.”19  
 Beyond interest group efforts to control the facts of litigation, ju-
dicial decisions, in general, are “a chance occurrence, with no guar-
antee that the litigants are representative of the universe of prob-
lems their case purports to present.”20 In particular, because courts 
almost always play a reactive role, they lack meaningful control of ei-
ther the facts or legal issues before them.21 For example, when Jerry 
Falwell claimed that he was libeled by a parody in Larry Flynt’s Hus-
tler magazine,22 or when Elian Gonzalez contended that immigration 
laws did not forbid a six-year-old from seeking political asylum,23 
courts had no choice but to issue groundbreaking rulings in cases 
whose notoriety had very little to do with legal issues. Far more of-
ten, of course, courts make landmark rulings in cases where the par-
ties are not well known but the facts are anything but typical—say a 
soccer mom arrested and handcuffed (with kids in tow) for failing to 
wear her seatbelt.24 
 And even if judges can somehow look beyond these “hard facts,” 
judicial decisionmaking is nevertheless bound by a case’s factual set-
                                                                                                                    
 19. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 41 (1977). Put another 
way, “Lawsuits do not alight like seed pods in courthouses to live out their natural lives. 
They are strategically initiated and strategically managed, always with an eye to predict-
ing what the relevant court will do.” Kathleen M. Sullivan, Supreme Court Avoidance, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1997, at C1. 
 20. HOROWITZ, supra note 19, at 41. 
 21. There are exceptions, of course. Some judges, for example, have asked lawyers to 
file suits raising a judge-identified set of legal issues. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD 
L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED 
AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998) (discussing the role of lower federal courts in shaping public pol-
icy on prison reform). Moreover, through rulings on motions to intervene as well as the cer-
tification of class action lawsuits, judges play some role in defining the facts and issues 
presented to them. In affirmative action litigation, for example, judges—by ruling on mo-
tions to intervene—determine whether the minority beneficiaries of affirmative action 
plans should be allowed to introduce evidence that neither party would otherwise intro-
duce, including evidence that the government has overtly or covertly discriminated on the 
basis of race. Finally, courts with the power of discretionary review—most notably the 
United States Supreme Court—can make use of delaying strategies to control whether and 
when they will decide a legal question. See infra Part IV (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should overcome limitations in its factfinding capacities through agenda control).  
 22. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT ON TRIAL (1988). 
 23. See Mary Leonard & Adam Pertman, Boy’s Scrawl May Initiate New Chapter in 
U.S. Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 2000, at A1. 
 24. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001), the Supreme Court em-
powered police officers to arrest individuals for minor traffic infractions. With that said, 
the case’s unusual facts seemed to influence Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—who ruled 
against the police and told Atwater’s attorney at oral argument that “[y]ou’ve got the per-
fect case.” Tony Mauro & Jonathan Ringel, Notebook: History Comes to the High Court, 
LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at 18 (quoting Justice O’Connor). And while Atwater involved 
an atypical plaintiff with sympathetic facts, it is often the case that plaintiffs are atypical 
but unsympathetic. See HOROWITZ, supra note 19, at 42-44 (listing some examples). 
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ting. Specifically, even when challenging the same statute, different 
plaintiffs have different stories to tell and, as such, advance alterna-
tive theories as to why the government’s action is improper. Con-
sider, for example, Georgia’s anti-sodomy statute. A married couple 
challenging this statute can argue both that the sanctity of marriage 
and a broader right to define their sexual relations supports invali-
dation of the statute. Michael Hardwick, a gay man arrested in his 
home, cannot talk about the sanctity of marriage but can invoke a 
right of individuals to define their sexual identity in the privacy of 
their homes. However, if Michael Hardwick had been arrested in a 
public park, he could only assert a broad right for individuals to de-
fine their sexual relations.  
 For Justices who believe in a broad right to define one’s sexual re-
lations, differences between these three scenarios are irrelevant; that 
is, the specific factual context will not impact that Justice’s think-
ing.25 Likewise, for Justices who believe that the state has unlimited 
power to criminalize sodomy (even between married couples in their 
homes), these factual differences are immaterial. But some Justices 
will draw lines between these three cases—so that the sequencing of 
which case comes first may well create a path that binds that Justice 
when considering another factual scenario. That, of course, is why 
the ACLU waited five years for the Bowers v. Hardwick case.26 It cre-
ated an opportunity to convince these swing Justices to embrace a 
broader theory of privacy than they would have if the sex-in-the-park 
case had come first.27  
 Of course, as it did in Bowers, the Court can limit its decision to 
the facts at hand.28 Yet, it is often the case that one judicial ruling es-
tablishes a path that other cases build upon.29 Interest groups under-
stand this and, as such, invest significant resources both in looking 
for cases with sympathetic plaintiffs and also in sorting through the 
                                                                                                                    
 25. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that the due process clause creates a “freedom not to conform”). 
 26. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). It is also why Justice William Brennan initially voted to 
grant certiorari in Bowers, for Brennan “had long wanted the Court to confront the [sod-
omy] issue and understandably saw Bowers as an all-but-perfect case.” GARROW, supra 
note 5, at 656. Ironically, Brennan later changed his vote after Justice Harry Blackmun 
suggested to him that the doctrinal underpinning of Roe v. Wade might be challenged in 
Bowers. See id. at 656-57. 
 27. In contrast, had the sex-in-the-park case come first, these Justices may have en-
dorsed a narrow vision of privacy—one that would have spelled doom not just for Michael 
Hardwick but also for the married couple. 
 28. In Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190, the Court limited its ruling to same-sex sodomy.  
 29. We are assuming here that stare decisis constrains judicial decisionmaking. For 
further discussion of the role that stare decisis plays in constitutional decisionmaking, see 
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991). 
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sequence in which legal issues should be presented to the Court.30 
Consider, for example, the NAACP’s carefully orchestrated attack 
against school segregation.31 Before seeking judicial review of public 
school segregation, the NAACP launched several lawsuits seeking to 
force the admission of African Americans into state law schools.32 
Specifically, since “most Southern states did not even attempt to 
maintain a façade of equality in professional educational facilities,”33 
the NAACP was able to cast doubt on the “separate but equal” de-
fense to racial segregation.34  
 The lesson here is simple: Constitutional rights, in critical re-
spects, are defined by the “fortuitous order of decision”—something 
that “no sensible theory of constitutional adjudication, interpretive or 
noninterpretive,” supports.35 This state of affairs is especially prob-
lematic today. Interest groups are more sophisticated in gaming the 
system than ever before. Furthermore, the modern Court is espe-
cially likely to confront difficult legal questions, that is, issues in 
which small changes in the facts (or legal arguments) may well affect 
outcomes. In particular, the thinning of the Court’s mandatory 
docket (so that most cases are heard by way of petitions for certio-
                                                                                                                    
 30. By sequencing legal issues this way, interest groups seek to establish a path that 
courts cannot avoid in subsequent decisionmaking. For general treatments of the costs and 
benefits of such path-dependent decisionmaking, see STEARNS, supra note 10, at 191-97; 
and Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 817-21 
(1982). 
 31. For detailed treatments, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); 
and MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 
1925-1950 (1987). For a more general treatment of interest group sequencing, see STEPHEN 
L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 193-218 (1995). 
 32. See Alfred H. Kelly, The School Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE 
SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 243, 253 (John A. Garraty ed., 1964) (explaining the beginning 
of the NAACP’s attack on segregated schools). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Easterbrook, supra note 30, at 819-20. Easterbrook illustrated this point by ex-
ploring hypothetically the implications on the Court’s jurisprudence if the Court had de-
cided Bowers in 1973 and did not address the abortion question until 1986: 
[i]t is a thought experiment worth pursuing, as no one wants a form of constitu-
tional adjudication in which judges always must increase their degree of “crea-
tivity” and depart still farther from the text—an approach that would be com-
pelled if every case built on the last one and urged “a little more” departure, fol-
lowed by extrapolation. We must therefore imagine a sequence in which the 
first case simply asks the Court to confirm the conventional wisdom (in 1973 
and before, that sodomy is not a fundamental right) and the second case seeks 
a departure (in this example, the arrival of the abortion question for the first 
time in 1986). 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 366 n.63 (1992). 
Easterbrook explained that the then-existing precedent implied that there was an absence 
of a fundamental right of intimate association; therefore, “[t]he abortion case would be 
simple after the sodomy case: if the Constitution does not protect sexual activities that 
have few effects on unconsenting parties, it does not protect decisions that affect the wel-
fare of other family members and the potential child.” Id. at 367. 
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rari) has allowed the Court more and more opportunities to tackle an 
ever-growing number of intercircuit conflicts on tough legal ques-
tions.36 
 Closely tied to the problem of interest group efforts to manipulate 
the Court’s docket is the question of what courts do with the informa-
tion they receive. In particular, because the Court very rarely hears 
matters about which the rule of law is “well settled,”37 the Justices’ 
first impression about the nature and strength of contending inter-
ests is critically important to Court decisionmaking. Furthermore, 
with an eightfold increase in amicus filings in recent decades, the 
Justices must develop techniques to sift through and assess the facts 
pertinent to them.38 For this very reason, an understanding of how 
judges sort through the information presented by parties and amici is 
key to understanding a case’s outcome and, more generally, the de-
velopment of law.39 If judicial decisions are “based on the judge’s 
hunches,” as Jerome Frank observed, “the way in which the judge 
gets his hunches is the key to the judicial process. Whatever pro-
duces the judge’s hunches makes the law.”40 
 Social science suggests that individuals, including judges, will 
overvalue initial impressions, even those based on imperfect informa-
tion.41 More precisely, psychologists have identified various cognitive 
biases that may cause individuals to misperceive the extent to which 
an initial impression can form a basis for predictions about the fu-
ture.42 Such biases result from the application of various heuristics 
employed to make probabilistic judgments.43 For instance, studies 
show that individuals are prone to assume that very small samples 
                                                                                                                    
 36. See Easterbrook, supra note 30, at 805-06; Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the 
Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 677 (1990) (noting that the growth in the number 
of judges sitting on the same court of appeals as well as the number of regional circuits in 
the 1980s (from eleven to thirteen) has “creat[ed] an intolerable pressure on the Supreme 
Court by generating more intercircuit conflicts”). 
 37. See Easterbrook, supra note 30, at 805-07 (explaining why the Supreme Court al-
most always hears hard cases, that is, cases in which both sides can present plausible ar-
guments to the Court). 
 38. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 16, at 751-56 (detailing exponential rise in 
amicus filings). 
 39. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); 
Guthrie et al., supra note 1; Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and 
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998). 
 40. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 104 (1930). 
 41. A study of 167 federal magistrates, for example, “suggests that even highly quali-
fied judges inevitably rely on cognitive decision-making processes that can produce sys-
tematic errors in judgment.” Guthrie et al., supra note 1, at 778, 779. For an overview of 
pre-1998 law review scholarship on this topic, see Langevoort, supra note 39. 
 42. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3-20 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (identifying three heuristics and the biases that result from 
each).  
 43. See id. at 3. 
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are representative of the characteristics of the larger population.44 
So, for example, individuals assume that the average height of ten 
randomly selected individuals will reflect the average height of the 
population at large.45 Further, studies have identified a second and 
related heuristic—the “availability” heuristic. More precisely, studies 
show that humans tend to assign probabilities of an occurrence based 
in part on whether they have personal experience with such an 
event.46 So, for instance, individuals who have recently witnessed an 
automobile accident will assign a higher probability to such an occur-
rence than individuals without such an experience.47 Availability and 
representativeness, in other words, operate as default rules which 
make particularized cost-benefit assessments less necessary and, in 
this way, serve as shortcuts that reduce the amount of information 
that a decisionmaker must gather.48 Finally, other studies show that 
individuals will “anchor” their views of an issue or situation on their 
initial assessment, even if that assessment is based upon less-than-
perfect information.49 Such anchoring effectively economizes on the 
amount of information that humans must process, protecting us from 
“information overload” and improving the quality of decisions.50 
                                                                                                                    
 44. See id. at 5-7; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small 
Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105, 105 (1971). 
 45. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 42, at 6. 
 46. See id. at 11. Correspondingly, “memory stories” play a large role in an individ-
ual’s understanding of facts. Rather than look to the “raw” evidence in reaching a final 
judgment, “decision makers construct [and rely upon] an intermediate summary represen-
tation.” Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, Implications of the Story Model for the Trial 
Judge’s Behavior, in FILTERING AND ANALYZING EVIDENCE IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 165, 
167 (Marilyn T. MacCrimmon & Monique Ouellette eds., 1993). Consider, for example, the 
O.J. Simpson murder trial. “African Americans know of many more stories (some apocry-
phal) of police racism and police brutality directed against members of their race than do 
White Americans.” Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, Explanation-Based Decision Making, 
in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 212, 216 (Terry Con-
nolly et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000). Consequently, African Americans were far more likely than 
whites to think that the police planted incriminating evidence. Id.  
 47. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Fre-
quency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 230 (1973); Tversky & Kahneman, su-
pra note 42, at 11. 
 48. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1189 
(1997) (referring to such heuristics as “second-order decisions” which reduce decision 
costs). 
 49.  Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 42, at 16-18. Relatedly, experts who are per-
sonally involved in a topic are more likely to find statistical evidence persuasive than are 
individuals with little or no preexisting knowledge. For nonexperts, vivid narratives (by 
creating a memorable and compelling anchor) are especially persuasive. See Elissa Lee & 
Laura Leets, Persuasive Storytelling by Hate Groups Online, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 927, 
930-31 (2002); see also Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of 
Worthy and Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (2003). 
 50. See infra note 65 and accompanying text; see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behav-
ioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998) (“While the 
heuristics are useful on average (which explains how they become adopted), they lead to 
errors in particular circumstances. This means that someone using such a rule of thumb 
may be behaving rationally in the sense of economizing on thinking time, but such a per-
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Moreover, once anchored, views or opinions are difficult to change, 
even if substantial information is adduced that tends to undermine 
the initial impression.51  
 The existence of these various heuristics is, of course, a purely 
psychological phenomenon, external, one might say, to jurisprudence. 
Still, by itself, the phenomenon would demand attention by lawyers, 
judges, and legislators seeking to minimize the distortions it might 
bring to the legal system. Because a judge’s understanding of the 
pertinent facts figures prominently in the standards of review that 
courts employ,52 the shortcuts that judges use to sort through the vol-
umes of information presented to them is critically important to the 
development of law. Judges, in other words, see the information pre-
sent in the particular case before them as part of a puzzle that they 
must sort out in order to resolve that case.53 As such, the science of 
judging requires judges to employ such information, precedent, and 
other sources of constitutional meaning to generate and apply a new 
rule that will itself serve as a paradigm (precedent) for solving osten-
sibly similar problems in the future.54 
 The problem, of course, is that the heuristics that judges employ 
can produce systematic errors in judgment.55 Operating as shortcuts 
                                                                                                                    
son will nonetheless make forecasts that are different from those that emerge from the 
standard rational-choice model.”). 
 51. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 41 (1980) (“[O]nce subjects have made a first pass at 
a problem, the initial judgment may prove remarkably resistant to further information, al-
ternative modes of reasoning, and even logical or evidentiary challenges.”); Paul Slovic & 
Sarah Lichtenstein, Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the Study of In-
formation Processing in Judgment, 6 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 649 
(1971). 
 52. See supra note 12; see also William S. Laufer & Steven D. Walt, The Law and Psy-
chology of Precedent, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 39, 48-50 (D.K. Kagehiro & 
W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) (asserting that judges might “anchor” on their first impression as 
“an exemplar of the population from which it is drawn”). 
 53. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 35-42 (2d ed. 
1970) (describing “[n]ormal science as [p]uzzle-solving”). 
 54. See id. at 23, 38-41 (analogizing scientific paradigms to “judicial decision[s] in the 
common law” and describing the role of rules in constructing paradigms); Laufer & Walt, 
supra note 52, at 48-50. In this way, of course, judges are different from legislators, who 
can “solve” the problem without generating any rule whatsoever, that is, by splitting the 
baby. Indeed, courts pay a high price for acting in this manner, as the Court learned in Roe 
when it announced the trimester framework. See generally BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG & 
DAVID M. O’BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1993) (detailing political fallout fol-
lowing the Court’s decision in Roe). 
 55. See Guthrie et al., supra note 1, at 780-81 (demonstrating how heuristics result in 
such systematic errors); see also Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behav-
ioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1051, 1085 (2000) (“[S]ystematic errors arise from the use of decision-making heuris-
tics that simplify decision-making tasks . . . .”). For a contrary argument suggesting that 
legal scholars employing behavioral economics often misunderstand the social science evi-
dence that lies at the foundation of behavioral economics, see Gregory Mitchell, Taking 
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that reduce decision costs, heuristic devices magnify errors in the 
baseline data set. Consider, for example, the related phenomenons of 
availability and anchoring. Since first impressions do not always 
provide useful exemplars of the characteristics of the population at 
issue, there is an obvious risk that courts will have the “wrong” first 
impression. And since courts often generate rules based on first im-
pressions, overreliance on a nonrepresentative anchor will generate 
the wrong rule. Courts, then, are subject to so-called “availability 
cascades” in which relatively rare and unimportant events create 
widespread misperceptions and, with them, snowball effects.56 Liti-
gants understand this and, consequently, search out sympathetic 
plaintiffs to air their grievances. More to the point, by seeing them-
selves as “availability entrepreneurs,” litigants will present courts 
with a very selective and polarized set of “facts” from which to make 
a decision.57 Even judges that are highly skilled at analyzing argu-
ments and evidence will have no reliable mechanism to determine 
which side is “right” or to which side the scale is tipped.58 Indeed, the 
“subtleties of how anchors affect decision making might simply lie 
beyond the basic intuitions of judges,”59 and as such, judges often 
utilize anchors that appear to be relevant but are in fact erroneous.60 
 Making matters worse, even a judge that wishes to change his 
mind will face other costs of doing so, costs that are unrelated to the 
biases we have described and instead inherent in what it means to be 
a judge, at least in our legal culture. To begin with, predictability 
and certainty in the legal system demand a strong presumption that 
like cases be treated alike. A Court that made clear that every past 
decision was constantly “up for grabs” would sow confusion among 
the public, vastly increase its own docket, and call into question its 
own competence.61 Moreover, by signaling that any particular deci-
sion might have a very short half-life, the Court could dampen the 
                                                                                                                    
Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis 
of the Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002). 
 56. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 683 (1999). 
 57. See id. at 687 (explaining that “availability entrepreneurs” will attempt to use 
their knowledge of availability cascades to “advance their own agendas”). 
 58. Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein put it this way: “Judges are subject to the avail-
ability heuristic, vulnerable to informational biases, and responsive to reputational incen-
tives. All this leaves them open to the influences of availability cascades.” Id. at 765. 
 59. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adapta-
tion?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 98 (2000). 
 60. See Guthrie et al., supra note 1, at 787-94 (discussing an empirical study of 167 
federal magistrates that demonstrates that judges commit error this way). 
 61. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (“[T]he 
labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could 
be reopened in every case . . . .”); cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992) 
(“There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts.”). 
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incentives that litigants—particularly institutional litigants—might 
have to invest resources in litigation in the first place.62 
 As described thus far, cognitive biases, when combined with vari-
ous aspects of judicial culture, would appear to have far-reaching 
consequences. More precisely, this combination would seem to ensure 
that, other things being equal, constitutional doctrine will necessar-
ily be hopelessly incoherent. We do not, however, believe that such a 
pessimistic prediction would be justified. The various biases that we 
have described do not by themselves produce ill-informed decisions. 
As noted earlier, these various heuristics often serve laudable pur-
poses. To begin with, they may reduce the costs of decisionmaking by 
dispensing with the requirement of gathering large amounts of in-
formation.63 “It is entirely rational,” as Judge Richard Posner ob-
served, “to rely on anecdotal evidence in the absence of better evi-
dence.”64 Put another way, the process by which a decision is made 
can be perfectly rational given the circumstances at the time even if 
the outcome is apparently irrational in light of all information and 
rationality (which may or may not be available at the time of the de-
cision). 
 Courts (especially the Supreme Court) therefore should seek to 
gain an understanding of how these mental shortcuts work. Not only 
will such an understanding help courts avoid errors caused by inap-
propriately relying on these devices; such heuristics can also improve 
the quality of the decisions made, by attenuating the effects of “in-
formation overload.”65 Thus, when first impressions are the correct 
ones, these biases reduce the costs and increase the probability of 
reaching the correct decisions. Contrariwise, cognitive biases only 
produce mistakes when first impressions are not typical of subse-
quent ones, that is, when information sets on which decisions are 
based are heterogenous. Translated to the context of litigation, cogni-
tive biases will lead to inaccurate results whenever the first case that 
                                                                                                                    
 62. See infra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing how stare decisis encour-
ages institutional and other litigants to invest in socially useful information); cf. PAUL H. 
RUBIN, BUSINESS FIRMS AND THE COMMON LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF EFFICIENT RULES 125 
(1983) (explaining the importance of stare decisis when applied to business litigants and 
the administrative process).  
 63. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
 64. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1551, 1572 (1998). Likewise, Posner argues that “[l]imited information must not be 
confused with irrationality.” Id. at 1573. With that said, Posner does not argue that deci-
sionmakers should not engage in factfinding in order to improve the data set that grounds 
their decisionmaking. Quite the contrary, Posner argues that courts would benefit from 
additional empirical evidence when sorting out legislative facts. See id. at 1570-75. 
 65. Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudica-
tion: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 123, 127 (1980-81) (“People use a number of 
simplifying operations, called ‘heuristics,’ to reduce the complexity of information which 
must be integrated to yield a decision. These simplifying strategies often lead to errors in 
judgment.”). 
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presents an issue to the Court is “nongeneralizable,” that is, when it 
generates a record for decision that does not apprise the Court of the 
true nature and strength of the contending constitutional values at 
stake. More precisely, a case is nongeneralizable, and thus likely to 
produce inaccurate results, if the parties before the Court and the ef-
fects on them of any rule the Court might pronounce are not repre-
sentative of the manner in which the rule will actually operate in the 
real world with respect to the cases that it will govern. Where, on the 
other hand, the first case that presents an issue to the Court is gen-
eralizable, that is, fairly representative of the strength and nature of 
contending interests, the cognitive biases we have identified will 
have no effect upon the accuracy of the Court’s decisions. 
 Any prediction about the extent to which various cognitive biases 
will affect the accuracy of judicial doctrine must depend upon some 
appraisal of the likelihood that cases reaching the Court will, in fact, 
be nongeneralizable. In the next Part, we will begin tackling this is-
sue. Specifically, through case studies on affirmative action and 
separation of church and state, we will call attention to the costs of 
overgeneralizing from a limited data set.   
III.   CASE STUDIES 
 Courts, as discussed above, are very much bound by the record of 
the case before them. Unlike legislators, who can personally investi-
gate competing constitutional and policy interests—by holding hear-
ings, taking polls, visiting constituents, and the like—judges almost 
always look to the record that is generated as a case grinds its way 
forward. And while policymaking judges may find ways to supple-
ment this record, it is nevertheless true that the content of this re-
cord is largely determined by the parties before the court.  
 How likely is it that the record in one case is generalizable to the 
broad range of issues that are raised by it? Common sense suggests 
that this likelihood will depend upon a variety of factors, among 
them standing doctrine, the wisdom with which the Court selects 
cases for review, resources available to certain classes of litigants, in-
centives various potential litigants might face, and the strategies 
adopted by institutional litigants who are repeat players and pre-
sumably understand better than most just how much “the facts mat-
ter.” If, for instance, anyone can challenge governmental action, one 
might expect a wide variety of plaintiffs and a high probability that 
cases reaching the Court would be nongeneralizable.66 Such cases 
                                                                                                                    
 66. Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-20 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The inter-
ests [taxpayers] represent, and the rights they espouse, are bereft of any personal or pro-
prietary coloration. They are, as litigants, indistinguishable from any group selected at 
random from among the general population, taxpayers and nontaxpayers alike.”).  
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will entail what is, in effect, an advisory opinion or, what may be 
worse, an opinion based upon idiosyncratic facts.67  
 Below, through case studies on affirmative action and separation 
of church and state, we call attention to the risks of the Court 
grounding its decisionmaking on a nongeneralizable set of facts. Ex-
trapolating from these case studies, moreover, we argue that there is 
substantial risk that the facts before the Court will be atypical, not 
generalizable. Correspondingly, to the extent that “availability en-
trepreneurs” (many of whom are experienced institutional advocates) 
succeed in controlling the facts and issues before the Court,68 these 
case studies vividly illustrate the risks of the Court jumping into a 
dispute without first taking steps to make sure that it has a good 
grasp of the range of cases that it might confront.  
A.   Affirmative Action: The Case of College and University 
Admissions 
 Racial preferences are found in numerous governmental programs 
and take a variety of forms, the most common of which are “plus sys-
tems.”69 Under such programs, race or ethnicity is merely one of sev-
eral factors that a decisionmaker must employ when awarding a gov-
ernment benefit.70 Such preferences, it should be noted, are generally 
not designed to remedy prior discrimination or otherwise achieve 
some notion of racial justice.71 Instead, they usually rest upon the 
                                                                                                                    
 67. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (noting that the Article III case or controversy requirement en-
sures “that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified 
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic 
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action” (emphasis added)); see also United 
States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961) (“[Advisory] opinions, such advance expres-
sions of legal judgment upon issues which remain unfocused because they are not pressed 
before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely 
framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every as-
pect of a multifaced situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests, we have con-
sistently refused to give.”); Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. 
REV. 1002, 1006 (1924) (“[A]dvisory opinions are bound to move in an unreal atmosphere. 
The impact of actuality and the intensities of immediacy are wanting. In the attitude of 
court and counsel, in the vigor of adequate representation of the facts behind legislation 
(lamentably inadequate even in contested litigation) there is thus a wide gulf of difference, 
partly rooted in psychologic factors, between opinions in advance of legislation and deci-
sions in litigation after such proposals are embodied into law. Advisory opinions are ren-
dered upon sterilized and mutilated issues.”). 
 68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 69. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335-36 (2003). 
 70. See id. 
 71. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court concluded that state colleges and uni-
versities have a compelling interest in diversity. Id. at 328-33. In so doing, the Court did 
not consider whether race discrimination contributed to minority underrepresentation at 
the University of Michigan. See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
313-15 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (opining that diversity constituted a compel-
ling state interest despite absence of findings of past discrimination).  
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conclusion that, other things being equal, an individual’s minority 
status will further the objective of the program in question.72 For in-
stance, the FCC’s practice of awarding a plus to minority applicants 
for broadcast licenses rested upon the belief that minority voices 
were underrepresented on the nation’s airwaves, and that consumers 
of broadcasting would benefit from more diverse airwaves.73  
 “Plus factor” programs, we argue below, will often involve dis-
putes that are “nongeneralizable,” that is, cases that produce records 
that offer a distorted picture of the nature and strength of the com-
peting values at stake. Most notably, we believe that classes of indi-
viduals that constitute potential plaintiffs in “plus factor” cases will 
be notably heterogeneous, even idiosyncratic, with the result that 
litigation involving such parties will produce records that reflect in-
complete information about the operation of the programs in ques-
tion. For this very reason, we think that Justice Powell committed 
error in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.74 By speak-
ing about the constitutionality of so-called “plus factor” programs 
without any understanding of the costs and benefits of such pro-
grams, Justice Powell transformed the debate over preferences with-
out a sufficient grounding in the facts of affirmative action.75  
 Consider two not-so-hypothetical plaintiffs. One, Allan Bakke, is a 
white male of German descent and a graduate of a prestigious state 
university.76 Mr. Bakke, who is significantly older than nearly all 
other applicants, is applying to law school. While his academic cre-
dentials are significantly better than those of the favored minorities 
admitted, they are about average for individuals who are not mem-
bers of favored minority groups. A second, Cheryl Hopwood, is a 
white female graduate of a less-than-prestigious public college.77 Ms. 
Hopwood worked her way through college, all the while raising a 
                                                                                                                    
 72. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 530 (finding that diversity confers substantial educational 
benefits). 
 73. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 
F.C.C. 2d 979, 980-81 (1978); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552-58, 566 
(1990) (sustaining preferences on these grounds). With that said, the FCC claimed that so-
cietal discrimination was the cause of minority underrepresentation in broadcasting and, 
as such, there is a remedial undercurrent running through FCC diversity preferences. See 
Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REV. 
125, 153 (1990). 
 74. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 75. See id. at 312-20. 
 76. Bakke graduated from the University of Minnesota. See Americans.net, A Brief 
History of Civil Rights in the United States of America: The Bakke Case, at 
http://www.africanamericans.com/thebakkecase.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2005). 
 77. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 564 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (noting that Cheryl 
Hopwood received an accounting degree from California State University in Sacramento), 
rev’d, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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mentally handicapped child and mentoring other children.78 She is 
now twenty-eight years old, older than most applicants to law school. 
 Assume now that each of these plaintiffs challenges the system of 
racial preferences in place at the University of Texas Law School in 
1992. Under the so-called “Texas plan,” all applicants were assigned 
a score—the so-called “Texas Index”—based upon their LSAT score 
and undergraduate grade point average.79 Moreover, the plan pro-
vided that non-minorities with a Texas Index score of 199 have a bet-
ter-than-ninety-percent chance of being admitted, while non-
minorities with a Texas Index score of 192 are presumptively re-
jected.80 Favored minorities with a Texas Index score of 189—below 
the presumptive deny score for other applicants—are automatically 
admitted.81  
 Assume that Cheryl Hopwood has a Texas Index score of 199, in 
the range of presumptive admission. Allan Bakke has a score of 197, 
just outside the range of presumptive admission, but within the 
range of discretionary admission (“on the bubble”). Texas considers 
Bakke’s file, finds him indistinguishable from hundreds of other in-
dividuals who were on the bubble, and rejects him. Moreover, where 
Cheryl Hopwood is concerned, the school takes the extraordinary 
step of adjusting her Texas Index score downward, purportedly be-
cause her undergraduate degree is from a less-than-prestigious 
school.82  
 Because the Texas plan treats individuals differently on account 
of their race, it must, at a minimum, be justified.83 Assume for the 
sake of argument that Texas seeks to justify its plan as an attempt to 
enhance the diversity of the student body so as to provide a more en-
riching educational experience for all students.84 Texas also claims 
that it wishes to reach out to provide educational opportunities to in-
dividuals who are members of racial groups that were once deprived 
of such opportunities.85 More precisely, instead of relying simply 
upon generalized indicia of academic merit, Texas says, it wants to 
give “individualized consideration” to every attribute that applicants 
might possess which bears on the ability of individuals to contribute 
to the educational process. In a sense, Texas could assert that it is 
                                                                                                                    
 78. See id. (noting that Cheryl Hopwood worked twenty to thirty hours per week in 
college, was active in Big Brothers and Big Sisters, and was raising a child born with cere-
bral palsy).  
 79. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1996).  
 80. See id. at 936-37. 
 81. Id.  
 82. See id. at 938; see also id. at 935-36 (noting that almost all of the applicants with 
Texas Index scores in the presumptive admit range were admitted). 
 83. See id. at 940 (applying strict scrutiny analysis to the Texas plan).  
 84. Id. at 944-48. 
 85. Id. at 948-55. 
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not really considering applicants’ race as such but is instead consid-
ering race incidentally to a consideration of the whole person.86 
 How might these two plaintiffs respond to the assertion that di-
versity is an interest of sufficient strength to justify their exclusion 
because of their race? They could, in the abstract, question whether 
diversity is an important or compelling interest of the sort that justi-
fies race-based line drawing. Moreover, in arguing that diversity is 
not a compelling interest, these plaintiffs would be placed in the posi-
tion of questioning determinations to the contrary by the admitted 
“experts” on the subject—academics—determinations that would be 
defended with great vigor by the academy and other interest 
groups.87 These plaintiffs would also have to deal with the assertion 
that such preferences are not really racial line drawing, but instead 
merely incidental to the individualized consideration of each appli-
cant.88 
 A straightforward attack on diversity as a compelling interest, 
then, would certainly be an uphill battle. There is, however, another 
tack that plaintiffs could take, a tack that does not require them to 
debate academics about the theoretical benefits of diversity. Such a 
tack, however, would only be available to Ms. Hopwood, and not Mr. 
Bakke. To be precise, Ms. Hopwood could ask, “What about me?” If, 
in fact, diversity really is such an important interest, why did Texas 
reject me? After all, I am a woman, and women are underrepresented 
in the legal profession and the Texas Bar. Moreover, I am older than 
most applicants and diverse for that reason. I have raised a handi-
capped child and mentored others, all the while pulling almost 
“straight A’s” and working my way through college. Certainly I have 
a “unique perspective” on family, education, and work—a perspective 
not likely shared by most applicants. If Texas was really interested 
in diversity, it would have given me individual consideration, consid-
eration that would have resulted in my admission. Instead, what 
                                                                                                                    
 86. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1047-52 
(1998). 
 87. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae the American Association of Law Schools, the 
American Council on Education, the Law School Admission Council and the Graduate 
Management Admissions Council in Support of Petitioners at 8-14, Texas v. Hopwood, 533 
U.S. 929 (2001) (No. 00-1609) (explaining race as a “critical component” in education pro-
grams). More significantly, in 2003 Supreme Court decisions upholding affirmative action 
at the University of Michigan, “[n]inety-one colleges and universities, as well as every ma-
jor educational association, filed briefs in support of the university.” Neal Devins, Explain-
ing Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 368 (2003). Not one college filed a brief op-
posing race preferences. “These briefs argued that ‘pluralistic, widely representative’ col-
leges provide a more enriching learning environment and better preparation for life in a 
multiracial world . . . .” See id. at 368 (citing briefs).  
 88. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (Powell, J., 
plurality opinion) (asserting that a properly administered plus system would not constitute 
intentional discrimination); Sullivan, supra note 86, at 1049-52. 
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“consideration” I did receive merely downgraded my application—
that is, gave me a “minus” instead of a plus! 
 To be sure, this story may seem unduly “personal.” Moreover, it 
would appear calculated to elicit sympathy from the Court hearing 
Ms. Hopwood’s claim. But, sympathy aside, the story just told would 
seem to cast significant light upon the strength and nature of inter-
ests at stake where Texas’ racial preferences are concerned. To begin 
with, Ms. Hopwood’s story casts serious doubt on any assertion that 
the Texas program is somehow “race-neutral” because it involves in-
dividual consideration of diversity factors other than race. If the 
Texas plan is race-neutral, one might ask, why did Ms. Hopwood not 
receive a “plus” for her own unique characteristics, or at least some 
meaningful consideration of them?89 Moreover, by pursuing diversity 
inconsistently, the school has called into question its own assertion 
that such an interest really is compelling in a constitutional sense.90 
At the very least, the realization that Texas is pursuing racial diver-
sity simpliciter would impose upon it a much heavier burden of justi-
fication.91 
 As noted above, Allan Bakke could not saddle Texas with such a 
burden. Simply put, he has a different story to tell. He is a white 
male, who, like many applicants, comes from a prestigious under-
graduate university. There is no indication that he has overcome any 
particular obstacles or that he has any attributes not shared by nu-
merous other individuals in the applicant pool, many of whom have 
better academic credentials than he. Thus, the failure of Texas to ac-
cord Mr. Bakke’s application any special consideration seems per-
                                                                                                                    
 89. To be sure, even with such a plus, she may have still been rejected—Texas may 
have properly downgraded her Texas Index score because her grade point average, ad-
justed for her college and undergraduate major, overstated her academic potential. Such a 
downgrade, however, could only be “proper” if Texas also downgraded minority applicants 
in similar circumstances. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 939.  
 90. See Alan J. Meese, Reinventing Bakke, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 381, 387-88 (1998); see 
also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1993) 
(noting that an interest that is not pursued consistently cannot be deemed compelling); 
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793 (1978). 
 91. One way of meeting this burden is to shift rationales, that is, to argue that race 
preferences are remedial. To do so, however, raises problems of its own. Even if a state 
university is willing to admit that it has discriminated in the past, it may not be able to 
convince a court that it has, in fact, discriminated in the past. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 292-93 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (discussing the type of evidence that must be introduced to convince a court 
about past discrimination). More significantly, because it fears exposing itself to liability, a 
university may be reluctant to admit that it has discriminated in the past. Thus, there is 
some risk that the proponents of affirmative action may understate the reasons supporting 
racial preferences. For this very reason, African-American students at the University of 
Michigan intervened in Gratz v. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 244, 257 (2003). In our view, courts 
should hear the stories of all affected interests. For this reason, liberalized intervention 
may be a sensible and appropriate way to overcome some of the problems of anchoring on 
an incomplete data set. 
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fectly consistent with the assertion that it is pursuing diversity in a 
consistent, race-neutral fashion. 
 It would thus appear that, while legally identical, Ms. Hopwood’s 
and Mr. Bakke’s claims would produce different records on which 
Courts would base their decisions. It is difficult to say that the Texas 
plan has really harmed Allan Bakke: it seems unlikely that he would 
have been admitted under a race-neutral scheme. Thus, the record 
produced by his case would suggest that the school had pursued a 
policy of racial diversity without casting an inordinate burden—
indeed, any burden—on non-minorities like the plaintiff. Ms. Hop-
wood, on the other hand, appears to possess a stronger application. 
Perhaps more significant, one record suggests that Texas is not 
really pursuing diversity at all but is instead simply pursuing some 
strategy of race-based proportional representation. Another will ap-
pear perfectly consistent—or at least not inconsistent—with the bona 
fide pursuit of a diversity strategy. Thus, the type of record the Court 
will see first, and hence its “anchor” where racial preferences in edu-
cation are concerned, will depend upon which case the Court hears 
first. From this anchor, of course, the Court may well generate a rule 
about whether diversity is not a compelling government interest, a 
rule that will apply to the case that it did not hear. Thus, a gener-
alizable rule will be produced based upon the facts that are not, in 
fact, generalizable. 
 This is not to say that different facts will necessarily produce dif-
ferent results. It is possible that the Court could reach the same out-
come—voiding or approving of preferences—regardless of which case 
it chooses to hear first. Some Justices may have hard-and-fast views 
on the permissibility vel non of preferences, views that cannot be 
changed.92 Other Justices, however, may be less sure of their views 
and more likely to take into account the facts of the case.93 Where, as 
                                                                                                                    
 92. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-28 (1989) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 356-79 (Brennan, J., concurring). These 
views may reflect strong “prior commitments” to particular constitutional values, such as 
equality before the law. Or, they may reflect personal experience or knowledge with the 
manner in which certain admissions processes operate. See Antonin Scalia, The Disease As 
Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race,” 1979 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 147 (1979). 
 93. Consider, for example, Justice O’Connor. Before deciding to uphold preferences in 
Grutter, her views on the constitutionality of affirmative action were unclear. Notwith-
standing the fact that she had sat on the Court for more than two decades and written sev-
eral opinions on the constitutionality of affirmative action, O’Connor’s decisions provided 
little concrete guidance for how she would rule on the constitutionality of preferences. For 
example, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), O’Connor’s decision 
for the Court was indeterminate. Although concluding that strict scrutiny review should be 
utilized in affirmative action cases, O’Connor also sought to “dispel the notion that strict 
scrutiny [review] is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’” Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)). Compare 
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612-31 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing 
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is often the case when racial preferences are concerned, such Justices 
provide the “swing votes,” cognitive biases and the identity of the 
first plaintiff who challenges the scheme in question may well carry 
the day. 
 Even if the outcome of the Court’s view of a particular program 
does not depend upon the facts presented, the way the Court explains 
that outcome might. Consider in this regard the Bakke case, where 
the Court evaluated a quota scheme, a scheme defended on the 
ground that it was necessary to enhance the diversity of the entering 
class.94 Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the 
Court explicitly held that the quota scheme was unconstitutional.95 
However, Powell also opined that “diversity” was a compelling state 
interest and that schools could properly seek to advance this interest 
by employing a plus system that gave credit to minorities and other 
diverse applicants for their diversity.96 In so doing, he did not rely 
upon any factual findings about the manner in which such a system 
actually operated, accepting amici’s assertions at face value.97  
 Imagine now what might have happened if Allan Bakke had in-
stead been Cheryl Hopwood. To be sure, there is no difference be-
tween these two plaintiffs that would suggest a different ruling on 
the validity of quotas. But what about Justice Powell’s advice regard-
ing the validity of a so-called plus system? Would Powell have issued 
this advice if Cheryl Hopwood had been the plaintiff? Perhaps not. 
Ms. Hopwood possessed important diversity characteristics. A failure 
by the University of California at Davis (“Davis”) to recognize and 
consider those characteristics when comparing her application to 
those of other non-minority applicants may well have given Justice 
Powell pause as he decided whether to go beyond his condemnation 
of quotas and endorse a plus system.98 More precisely, a failure by 
Davis to accord Ms. Hopwood any individualized consideration would 
have called into question any assertion that diversity was a compel-
ling state interest.99 Such failure could also have caused Powell skep-
                                                                                                                    
that diversity preferences in broadcasting rested upon an impermissible stereotype), with 
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(refusing to consider whether racial diversity would support consideration of race when 
hiring high school teachers). For an excellent treatment of “swing Justices” that uses Jus-
tice O’Connor as a case study, see Dahlia Lithwick, A High Court of One: The Role of the 
“Swing Voter” in the 2002 Term, in A YEAR AT THE SUPREME COURT (Neal Devins & Davi-
son M. Douglas eds., 2004). 
 94. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15.  
 95. See id. at 314-15, 318-20 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). 
 96. See id. at 315-19.  
 97. See Meese, supra note 90, at 384-86 (explaining how amici curiae raised the issue 
of “plus factor” systems for the first time in the Supreme Court). 
 98. There is no indication that Davis did, in fact, consider diversity characteristics of 
non-minorities. 
 99. See Meese, supra note 90, at 387. 
344  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:323 
 
ticism about the bona fides of a plus system and may well have led 
the Justice to adhere to his initial course, to vote to void Davis’s 
quota plan while leaving the validity of a plus system for another 
day.100 Thus, any statement about the validity of a plus system would 
have awaited a controversy in which the question was squarely pre-
sented and not simply raised in amici briefs.101 Such a delay would 
certainly have altered the discourse in the political branches about 
the constitutional status of preferences. For instance, politicians 
could no longer justify such preferences by hiding behind the cover of 
Bakke but would instead be forced to take responsibility for their own 
interpretation of the Constitution.102 Nor could individual institutions 
or their trade associations be able to rely upon Bakke.103 
 And what if Bakke, instead of involving a challenge to a set-aside, 
concerned a “plus factor” scheme? Of course, if Alan Bakke were the 
plaintiff, the Justices would have approved such a scheme.104 But 
what if Cheryl Hopwood were the plaintiff? Here, there is every rea-
son to think that the Court would have questioned the legitimacy of a 
diversity scheme that excluded someone as sympathetic as Cheryl 
Hopwood. Indeed, it was for this very reason that the right-leaning 
Center for Individual Rights recruited Cheryl Hopwood to be the lead 
plaintiff in its challenge to the University of Texas’ affirmative action 
program.105 In other words, just as Bakke was skewed by an unsym-
pathetic plaintiff, future challenges to affirmative action may well 
                                                                                                                    
 100. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 486-87 (1994) (explain-
ing that Powell initially planned simply to affirm the judgment of the California Supreme 
Court voiding Davis’s quota scheme); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 79-86 (1988) (showing that Justice Powell’s initial draft 
simply voided the Davis quota system without opining on the validity of a plus system). Is 
it possible that Powell—rather than defend the legitimacy of plus systems—would have 
questioned all diversity-based justifications for affirmative action?  
 101. Ironically, Justice Powell followed just such a course in a subsequent antitrust de-
cision. In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), the Court evalu-
ated a finding that the defendant had terminated the plaintiff pursuant to a price-fixing 
conspiracy. The United States filed an amicus brief arguing that such conspiracies should 
be analyzed under the Rule of Reason and not considered unlawful per se, as was the case 
under current law. In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Court declined to consider the 
United States’ argument on the ground that it was first raised in an amicus brief. See id. 
at 761, n.7. 
 102. See Nondiscrimination in Federally-Assisted Program; Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964; Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 58509, 58510 (Oct. 10, 1979) (to be codified 
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 80) (contending that Bakke affirmed the legality of racial preferences). 
 103. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 100, at 160-63. 
 104. In such a case, Justice Powell’s dicta about “plus factor” schemes would have be-
come the Court’s holding. 
 105. See Michael S. Greve, The Demise of Race-Based Admissions Policies, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 19, 1989, at B6 (Center for Individual Rights (CIR) cofounder describ-
ing Hopwood litigation as “an opening salvo” in a “larger strategy”); Jonathan Groner, Cen-
ter Ring, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 9, 2002, at 1; David Segal, Putting Affirmative Action on Trial, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1998, at A1 (describing CIR efforts to seek out sympathetic plain-
tiffs).  
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involve plaintiffs who are far more diverse than the typical non-
minority applicant. 
B.   Church-State Separation: The Case of School Vouchers 
 Just as the class of potential plaintiffs can be heterogeneous, dif-
ferent defendants can also tell dramatically different stories. Interest 
group litigators understand this; they are as determined to find an 
unsympathetic defendant as they are in locating a sympathetic 
plaintiff. Consider, for example, the case of school vouchers. Some de-
fendants can tell a compelling story about voucher plans providing 
an escape route from failing public school systems for disproportion-
ately poor, disproportionately minority students. Other defendants, 
however, are far less sympathetic; their voucher schemes may seem 
little more than an economic windfall to religious parents already 
committed to sending their children to religious schools.106  
 Like affirmative action, an understanding of the costs and bene-
fits of voucher programs cannot be based on the examination of any 
single plan; instead, it requires familiarity with the range of voucher 
plans employed by school systems. Were the Court to build its 
voucher doctrine around nongeneralizable cases, it might well com-
mit error. Decisionmaking anchored on the facts of a sympathetic de-
fendant might result in standards of review that discount the risks of 
a state-funded religious spoils system. But doctrine moored to the 
facts of an unsympathetic defendant might foreclose all voucher 
schemes, even those that are well designed to serve compelling gov-
ernmental interests. 
 As it turns out, Supreme Court decisions on this issue are closely 
tied to the specific facts before the Court. In 1973, the Court—while 
not ruling on the constitutionality of a voucher scheme—signaled its 
skepticism of such programs. Rejecting a New York plan that would 
provide either a “tuition reimbursement grant” or tax relief to par-
ents who send their children to private schools, the Court found it ir-
relevant that the “grants are delivered to parents rather than 
schools.”107 As we will soon detail, this decision, Committee for Public 
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, was very much influenced 
by the fact that Catholic school interests helped shape the New York 
                                                                                                                    
 106. Of course, whether such programs really are a windfall would depend upon the 
baseline that one adopts. If one begins with a baseline of state monopoly schools, supported 
by coercive levies, without regard to the benefits the taxpayer might receive from such pro-
grams, then vouchers provide a windfall of sorts to parents who send their children to pri-
vate schools. If, on the other hand, one assumes a common law baseline, where individuals 
pay taxes only when necessary to produce collective goods, then vouchers are not a windfall 
but, instead, simply a method of returning to taxpayers who send their children to private 
school money they have overpaid. 
 107. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781-83 (1973). 
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law (and, correspondingly, that eighty-five percent of participating 
schools were church-affiliated).108  
 By 2002, however, the Court approved a Cleveland, Ohio, voucher 
program precisely because parents, not schools, were given vouchers. 
Concluding that the Cleveland program “confers educational assis-
tance directly to a broad class of individuals defined without refer-
ence to religion,”109 the Court thought it irrelevant that eighty-two 
percent of the participating schools were religious, principally Catho-
lic.110 In reaching this 5-4 decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the 
factual background of the case may have been controlling. Unlike the 
New York plan, religious school interests were not the driving force 
behind the Cleveland plan. The driving force, instead, was Cleve-
land’s failing public school system.111  
 Before providing additional details about the New York and 
Cleveland plans, we readily concede that the Court’s approval of one 
plan and rejection of the other may also be tied to material differ-
ences between the two plans.112 The problem with New York’s “paren-
tal choice” program was that the state’s claims about its desire to in-
vest in secular education, not religious indoctrination, did not jibe 
with the statutory scheme. Most notably, while the Cleveland plan 
forbade participating schools from making religious-based admission 
decisions, the New York plan allowed such schools to participate in 
the program.113 But even if the two plans were identical, proponents 
of the Cleveland plan would have a much better story to tell than 
those backing the New York plan. More to the point, just as Cheryl 
                                                                                                                    
 108. Id. at 768. For additional discussion, see infra notes 120-21 and accompanying 
text. 
 109. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002). 
 110. Id. at 657. Likewise, the Court did not take into account the fact that some of the 
participating schools had a pervasively sectarian character. One school, for example, noted 
in its informational materials that “‘total religious instruction is the major focus of the 
educational program. . . . Lessons learned in formal religious classes are purposefully car-
ried over into all subject areas.’” Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School 
Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 417, 434 (2000) (quoting Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725, 729 (N.D. 
Ohio 1999)). 
 111. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644-45, 647.  
 112. With that said, Nyquist and Zelman make use of different standards of review. In 
his Zelman dissent, Justice David Souter contrasts the two rulings. Applauding the Ny-
quist Court’s examination of where state funds wind up, Souter condemns the Zelman 
Court for only asking whether secular schools are eligible to participate in the Cleveland 
program. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 692-93 (Souter, J., dissenting). For Souter, this analysis is 
simply “rhetorical,” replacing “realism [with] formalism.” Id. at 700, 693 (Souter, J., dis-
senting). Whatever one thinks of Souter’s analysis, we certainly agree that the Court’s rea-
soning in Zelman and Nyquist are difficult to square. 
 113. The New York statute, moreover, also included direct aid to private schools. These 
schools were overwhelmingly Catholic. This difference, however, supports our argument. 
Rather than sever this provision, the Court understood the other provisions through the 
lens of state efforts to favor Catholic school interests. 
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Hopwood was better positioned than Alan Bakke to call attention to 
limits in Texas’ diversity rationale, defenders of the Cleveland plan 
were better able to highlight the secular benefits of a voucher 
scheme.  
 Assume that New York and Cleveland both adopt the following 
voucher program:114 Students whose family income is not more than 
200% of the federal poverty level are eligible to receive a voucher of 
up to $5000. Participating schools cannot charge more than $5000 
nor can they deny admission to students on the basis of religion or 
race. No restrictions are placed on how the schools may use the 
money—so that participating schools could make use of state funds 
to support religious activities. Participating schools, however, cannot 
advocate or foster hatred on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion. 
Assume also that eighty-five percent of participating schools are reli-
gious, although that number can fluctuate.115  
 Because the overwhelming number of schools that benefit from 
this voucher plan are religious, New York and Cleveland will have to 
explain why this funding scheme does not impermissibly establish 
religion. Up to a point, New York and Cleveland will make identical 
arguments. They will note that secular schools may participate in the 
program and that the number of secular schools may well increase 
over time.116 They may also point out that the relevant “program” is 
not simply the voucher scheme but instead all public financial sup-
port for education, including the creation and maintenance of the 
public schools. If so, then support for sectarian schools would con-
sume only a small portion of the state’s overall expenditures on edu-
cation and thus would not advance religion in any meaningful 
sense.117 Correspondingly, they will argue that the program “distrib-
utes aid to parents, who in turn redirect that aid to participating 
schools through entirely uncoerced decisions.”118 As such, parents are 
                                                                                                                    
 114. The following program largely mirrors the Cleveland plan that the Supreme Court 
upheld in Zelman. For descriptions of the Cleveland program, see Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644-
48; and Macedo, supra note 110, at 433-38.  
 115. Indeed, as Milton and Rose Friedman argued, this percentage could depend upon 
the presence or absence of a voucher scheme. In particular, the Friedmans argued that the 
existence of a voucher scheme would actually increase the proportion of nonsectarian pri-
vate schools, because such a scheme would attract profit-maximizing enterprises to a 
field—private schooling—currently dominated by nonprofit, religious enterprises. See 
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 152-
54 (1980) [hereinafter FREE TO CHOOSE]. 
 116. Brief on the Merits at 36, Zelman (No. 00-1779) (noting that “the present statis-
tics present only a snapshot in the evolving life of the program”); see also FREE TO CHOOSE, 
supra note 115, at 152-54. 
 117. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 
YALE L.J. 1311, 1364-67 (2002) (explaining how the Court has addressed the issue of reli-
gious funding and the Establishment clause). 
 118. Brief of State Petitioners at 21, Zelman (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779); see also 
Brief for Appellees-Appellants Nyquist, Levitt and Gallman at 22, Nyquist (Nos. 72-694, 
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free to choose to send their children to a religious school, nonreligious 
school, or even keep their child in the public school system. Finally, 
they will call attention to the critical role that religious schools can 
and do play in providing secular education to students. For example, 
they will cite statistics demonstrating the “outstanding secular edu-
cation and citizenship achievements” at religious schools, including 
comparatively high scores on national achievement tests.119   
 Notwithstanding similarities in the arguments that New York 
and Cleveland would make, the factual contexts of the two cases are 
profoundly different. As already noted, the New York plan was en-
acted at the behest of powerful religious interests.120 Claiming that 
low-income parents would soon remove their children from nonpublic 
schools, religious school interests argued both that the state had an 
independent interest in allowing low-income parents to send their 
children to nonpublic schools and that the state would face a fiscal 
crisis if students attending religious schools were to attend public 
schools.121  
 By validating this argument, New York lawmakers did more than 
save the state some money. They also facilitated religious segrega-
tion.122 Religious parents already committed to sending their children 
to a religious school would continue to do so. And even if a significant 
number of nonadherents were to attend religious school, the New 
York statute was nonetheless intended to help religious schools 
maintain enrollment levels.  
                                                                                                                    
72-753, 72-791, 72-929) (stating that the program “does not provide for payment of money 
directly to the schools but merely recognizes the financial burden of parents of nonpublic 
school children”). 
 119. Brief for the Hanna Perkins School, et al., Petitioners at 11, Zelman (No. 00-
1777). 
 120. Brief for Appellants at 14, Nyquist (Nos. 72-691, 72-753, 72-791, 72-929) (noting 
newspaper coverage of the statute’s enactment made clear that “sectarian pressures 
play[ed] a significant if not major role” in the bill’s passage); Brief of the Baptist Joint 
Committee of Public Affairs as Amicus Curiae at 8, Nyquist (No. 72-694) (arguing that 
“[o]nly these religious schools were active in encouraging the legislature to enact the con-
tested legislation”); Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 
CONN. L. REV. 807, 816-22 (1999) (discussing power of religious interests to obtain state 
funding). 
 121. State officials explicitly embraced this argument. A brief filed by the majority 
leader of the New York State Senate detailed the state fiscal crisis and the difficulties that 
many communities would face if religious school students were to attend public schools. 
Brief on Behalf of Appellee Warren M. Anderson at 11-15, Nyquist (Nos. 72-601, 72-753, 
72-791, 72-929). 
 122. In Nyquist, eighty-five percent of parents eligible to receive tuition support sent 
their children to Catholic schools. See Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the National Edu-
cation Association and the Horace Mann League at 16, Nyquist (No.72-694). And while the 
New York statute allowed religious schools to make religion-based admissions decisions, a 
statute that forbid such an admissions policy would nevertheless result in a significant 
amount of religious isolation. In particular, if the beneficiaries of the program were princi-
pally parents who already enrolled their children in religious schools, it is almost certainly 
the case that those schools would maintain their religious identity. 
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 Cleveland would not be saddled with the burdens of defending a 
plan that smacks of religious favoritism. Its plan could be distin-
guished from the ostensibly identical New York plan in the following 
way: “To put it simply, in [New York], religious schools were the 
ends, while here religious schools are part of the means toward the 
goal of broadening [secular] educational opportunities.”123 Specifi-
cally, even if eighty-five percent of the participating schools in New 
York and Cleveland are religious, the impetus for the Cleveland plan 
was a failing public school system.  
 Before adopting a voucher scheme in Cleveland, a federal district 
court judge “declared a ‘crisis of magnitude’ and placed the entire 
Cleveland school district under state control.”124 A state auditor like-
wise found that Cleveland’s public schools “were in the midst of a 
‘crisis that is perhaps unprecedented in the history of American edu-
cation.’”125 The district failed to meet any of the eighteen standards 
set by the state to guarantee minimal acceptable performance.126 
More than two-thirds of students dropped or flunked out of high 
school (and those who did graduate performed less well than their 
counterparts in other cities).127 Making matters worse, the vast ma-
jority of children attending Cleveland public schools were from low-
income and minority families.128 In other words, unlike the potential 
fiscal crisis that prompted New York lawmakers, the Cleveland 
voucher scheme could easily be portrayed as a needed effort to save 
overwhelmingly poor, overwhelmingly minority students from one of 
the “worst performing public schools in the Nation.”129  
 The Cleveland scheme, moreover, was intended to encourage par-
ents to remove their children from failing public schools. In contrast, 
the beneficiaries of the New York program were parents who had al-
ready removed their children from public schools, principally to at-
tend religious schools. Consequently, defenders of the Cleveland 
plan—unlike their New York counterparts—could argue that their 
voucher scheme was no more and no less than an effort to provide 
better educational opportunities for predominantly poor, predomi-
nantly minority students. Defenders of the New York plan, in con-
                                                                                                                    
 123. Brief on the Merits at 15, Zelman (No. 00-1779) (distinguishing Nyquist from the 
Cleveland plan). 
 124. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644 (citation omitted). 
 125. Id. (quoting JIM PETRO, AUDITOR OF STATE, STATE OF OHIO, CLEVELAND CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT PERFORMANCE AUDIT 2-1 (Mar. 1996)). 
 126. Id.  
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. 
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trast, could not escape the fact that their plan was first and foremost 
an effort to accommodate religious parents.130 
 One other argument would be available to proponents of the 
Cleveland plan. The racial composition of private schools participat-
ing in the voucher plan is more likely to reflect the overall composi-
tion of the Cleveland metropolitan area than are the Cleveland pub-
lic schools.131 In particular, because Cleveland’s inner-city public 
schools are overwhelmingly minority, the voucher plan might well fa-
cilitate, not subvert, racial integration within the schools.132 Defend-
ers of the New York plan could not make this argument. Religious 
schools, including Catholic schools, are often highly segregated.133 A 
voucher plan that encouraged parents of private school students to 
keep those students in private schools would not facilitate racial in-
tegration. 
 To summarize, differences in the stories that New York and 
Cleveland can tell about their respective voucher schemes might well 
prove consequential, even determinative, to the Supreme Court. 
Even if the two plans had identical provisions and even if the same 
percentage of religious schools were participating in both programs, 
the records of the two cases would be quite different. Opponents of 
the New York plan could argue that the plan was intended to 
strengthen sectarian education, preserve the status quo, and, in so 
doing, segregate students on religious grounds. Opponents to the 
Cleveland voucher, in contrast, would have a far more difficult time 
convincing the Court to adopt a legal rule that would deem vouchers 
an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Their demand that 
voucher schemes must include a sizable percentage of nonreligious 
private schools might appear insensitive to governmental efforts to 
change the status quo by finding innovative ways to help dispropor-
                                                                                                                    
 130. Rather than reinforce religious segregation, the vast majority of students partici-
pating in the Cleveland plan would be attending schools of a different faith than their own. 
Brief for the Hanna Perkins School, et al., Petitioners at 8, Zelman (No. 00-1777). Indeed, 
parents participating in the voucher plan thought the religious affiliation of a school was 
the least important of five listed factors. Brief of State Petitioners at 11, Zelman (Nos. 00-
1751, 00-1777, 00-1779). 
 131. Brief of American Education Reform Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners at 9, Zelman (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779) (citations omitted). 
 132. Opponents of the voucher plan strongly disagreed with this claim. Noting that a 
disproportionate number of white students were participating in the voucher plan, oppo-
nents claimed that the voucher plan exacerbated problems of racial isolation in the Cleve-
land public schools. See Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association, et al. at 
17-18, Zelman (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779) (citing KIM METCALF, IND. CTR. FOR 
EVALUATION, EVALUATION OF THE CLEVELAND SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 1998-2000, 
TECHNICAL REPORT (2001)). 
 133. Robert L. Crain & Christine H. Rossell, Catholic Schools and Racial Segregation, 
in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 184, 185 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989). For a competing 
perspective, see JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, 
CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982). 
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tionately poor, disproportionately minority students attending failing 
schools.134 
 It would thus appear that facts played a large part in the Court’s 
disparate rulings in Nyquist and Zelman. Although Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was the only Justice to participate in both cases, the social 
meaning of school vouchers had undergone a radical transformation 
by the time of the Cleveland case.135 Justice O’Connor, for example, 
wrapped up her concurring opinion in Zelman by suggesting that the 
“reasoning in the Court’s opinion” matched “the realities of the 
Cleveland educational system.”136 In other words, just as Nyquist 
may have been skewed by an unsympathetic defendant, Zelman, too, 
may have been impacted by a sympathetic defendant. As in the af-
firmative action context, the Court’s reasoning on the issue of the 
separation of church and state may be closely tied to the relative 
sympathies of the parties to the dispute.  
IV.   CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF DELAYING STRATEGIES 
 When deciding cases involving nongeneralizable claims, the Su-
preme Court is apt to base its decision in faulty factual suppositions. 
As our case studies on affirmative action and school vouchers make 
clear, these cases involve idiosyncratic facts that do not shed suffi-
cient light on the competing constitutional values involved. For ex-
ample, by deciding the Bakke case in 1978, the Court grounded much 
of its affirmative action jurisprudence around a plaintiff who shed 
almost no light on the costs and benefits of diversity-based affirma-
tive action. Likewise, the 1973 Nyquist decision was anchored in a 
set of facts that highlighted the downsides of voucher schemes. At 
the same time, had the Court built its affirmative action doctrine 
around Cheryl Hopwood or its voucher doctrine around the failed 
Cleveland public school system, the Court might have issued rulings 
that were equally out of step with reality. Indeed, the Court’s implicit 
repudiation of Nyquist in its 2002 Zelman decision calls attention to 
the problems of building durable doctrine around nongeneralizable 
facts. 
                                                                                                                    
 134. Admittedly, the public school establishment and some of the civil rights estab-
lishment opposes vouchers, claiming that the state ought to invest in public education. In 
Zelman, for example, the National School Boards Association and the NAACP Legal De-
fense Fund both filed briefs opposing the voucher plan. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 643. 
 135. For an overview of the changed meaning of school vouchers from 1980-2000, see 
Neal Devins, Social Meaning and School Vouchers, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919 (2001). 
 136. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 676 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Other Justices may have 
found differences in the stories that New York and Cleveland could tell to be legally irrele-
vant. In cases where the Court is divided 5-4, however, the views of one or two Justices 
may prove dispositive both to the outcome and to the legal reasoning employed by the 
Court. 
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 What, then, should the Supreme Court do when confronted with 
nongeneralizable claims? Should the Justices issue narrow fact-
specific minimalist decisions? Should they quickly issue more deci-
sive rulings and simply overturn those decisions when the doctrine 
proves unworkable? Or should they issue decisive rulings but use 
certiorari denials and other delaying strategies to provide lower fed-
eral courts with an opportunity to develop a factual record on the is-
sue?137 In sorting out which approach is best, one’s view of the Court’s 
institutional role and capacity will prove decisive. For reasons that 
we will now detail, we think that the Supreme Court ought to make 
use of delaying strategies when first confronted with nongeneraliz-
able claims.  
 As noted throughout this Article, judges generate precedent based 
upon the set of information present in the particular case before 
them. These precedents, for a variety of reasons, are hard to over-
rule. As explained in Part II, anchoring and heuristics that decision-
makers rely upon make it harder to rethink the factual premises of 
earlier determinations. Furthermore, even a judge that wishes to 
change his mind will face other costs of doing so—costs that are un-
related to the biases we have described and instead are inherent in 
what it means to be a judge, at least in our culture. To begin with, 
predictability and certainty in the legal system demand a strong pre-
sumption that like cases be treated alike. A Court that made clear 
that every past decision was constantly “up for grabs” would sow con-
fusion among the public, vastly increase its own docket, and call into 
question its own competence.138 Litigants, moreover, would not want 
to spend significant resources gathering information, filing briefs, 
and making arguments knowing full well that today’s decision might 
be reversed tomorrow.139 Failure to reverse itself, however, will leave 
the Court subject to increasing criticism for adhering to a rule based 
on incomplete facts.140 One would not be surprised if the Court chose 
instead to take a “middle course,” backtracking slowly, while rechar-
acterizing prior caselaw without formerly overruling it. Such a mud-
dling course raises its own set of problems. While avoiding the ille-
                                                                                                                    
 137. Another option would be to use justiciablity doctrine to steer clear of the dispute 
altogether. We will not discuss this option for two reasons. First, a nongeneralizable claim 
may be clearly justiciable. Second, as we will soon explain, we think that the Supreme 
Court should play an important and active role in shaping constitutional values. 
 138. CARDOZO, supra note 61, at 149 (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost 
to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case . . . .”); cf. 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992) (“There is a limit to the amount of 
error that can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts.”). 
 139. But if litigants have an understanding of the phenomenon of anchoring, they may 
well still invest significant resources in litigation, knowing that first impressions matter, 
even if courts do not otherwise adhere to something like stare decisis. 
 140. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 841-44 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring); Con-
tinental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977). 
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gitimacy costs of overturning doctrine, this mangling of stare decisis 
undermines predictability and certainty in the legal system. By turn-
ing stare decisis into a shell game, moreover, this muddling course 
calls into question the Court’s ability to fashion longstanding, pre-
dictable rules.  
 Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court ought not to rely on 
first impressions in making far-reaching decisions. While lower 
courts have no choice but to rule on such cases, the Supreme Court 
must take into account the obvious risk that a “wrong” impression 
will generate the wrong rule. Moreover, for reasons just detailed, cer-
tain aspects of the legal system and judicial culture likely serve to 
exacerbate the negative consequences of such decisionmaking. 
 Pointing to inherent limits in judicial capacity, a new breed of ju-
dicial minimalists argues that the Court is ill equipped to issue broad 
and deep rulings that are grounded in facts.141 Instead, these mini-
malists argue that the Court ought to facilitate democratic delibera-
tion by issuing narrow rulings (some of which may simply be provi-
sional).142 In our view, however, judicial minimalism throws the baby 
out with the bath water. While protecting the Court from overly 
broad rulings grounded in faulty factual suppositions, the issuing of 
narrow, indeterminate rulings unduly limits the Court’s power to 
shape constitutional values.  
 Specifically, with little law to follow, elected officials will either 
ignore the Court or, alternatively, spin indeterminate Supreme Court 
decisions to serve their own purposes.143 Political branch interpreta-
tion should not take place in such a vacuum but, instead, should be 
part of a dialogue between the political branches and the Court, each 
of which brings different perspectives and expertise to bear on consti-
tutional problems. In particular, courts are more likely than other 
government actors to “appeal to men’s better natures, to call forth 
their aspirations”144 and to be a “voice of reason . . . articulating and 
developing impersonal and durable principles.”145  
 The logic of our system of checks and balances is that “the effec-
tiveness of the whole depends on [each branch’s] involvement with 
one another . . . even if it often is the sweaty intimacy of creatures 
                                                                                                                    
 141. See generally Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000). 
 142. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 259. 
 143. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 144. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 26 (2d ed. 1962). 
 145. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreward: The Time Chart 
of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959); see also Neal Devins, The Democracy-
Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1999) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE 
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999)). 
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locked in combat.”146 More to the point, just as the courts need elected 
government to implement their decisions, the political branches need 
the courts. By sometimes invoking high-sounding principles when 
striking down elected-government action, Court rulings upholding 
governmental decisionmaking have greater force.147 
 In sorting out how to approach nongeneralizable cases, the Court 
must recognize its strengths and its limits. On the one hand, the 
Court must speak clearly and persuasively if it is to shape the 
method and context of constitutional discourse undertaken by the po-
litical branches. At the same time, a Court that pays no mind to the 
facts and simply announces broad pronouncements of the Constitu-
tion’s meaning will often render unworkable decisions. For reasons 
we will now detail, we think that there is a mechanism by which the 
Court can balance inherent limits in judicial factfinding with its 
needs to speak forcefully on constitutional questions. Specifically, we 
think that the Court ought to employ a case management approach, 
using certiorari denials and other “passive virtues” to provide a time 
lag between governmental action and adjudication.148 
 By exercising great caution before deciding nongeneralizable 
cases, the Court may fully engage itself in these disputes at a time 
when the “facts” are better known to it and to the nation. Under this 
proposal, of course, politicians and lower court judges will (at least 
initially) have free reign to decide these issues. But when the Su-
preme Court enters the fray, it will do so at a time when it is better 
positioned both to speak clearly and to make an informed decision. In 
particular, by allowing several lower court judges to develop facts 
through adversarial litigation, the Court need not rely on works of 
advocacy (party and amicus briefs). Moreover, by letting the facts 
“percolate” this way, the Court is less bound by the arguments made 
by the parties to a single lawsuit and, consequently, will better ap-
preciate what issues are presented by the case before it. While such a 
strategy would leave lower courts susceptible to the various biases 
we have described, it would allow the Supreme Court to avoid them. 
For, by deferring its own decision until several lower courts have 
spoken, the Court can assume that any decision it makes is premised 
upon a relatively full information set—that is, the facts and opinions 
of the various lower courts that have heard admittedly nongeneraliz-
                                                                                                                    
 146. BICKEL, supra note 144, at 261. 
 147. Charles L. Black, Jr. has explained the way that this works: “What a government 
of limited powers needs, at the beginning and forever, is some means of satisfying the peo-
ple that it has taken all steps humanly possible to stay within its powers. . . . [T]he Court, 
through its history, has acted as the legitimator of the government.” CHARLES L. BLACK, 
JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 52 (1960).  
 148. For the definitive treatment of the “passive virtues,” see BICKEL, supra note 144, 
at 111-98. Needless to say, our proposal is influenced by Bickel’s writings (even though 
Bickel never considered the question of judicial misperceptions of facts). 
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able cases. By aggregating the facts and opinions of these various 
cases, the Court can ensure that its “anchor” better reflects the great 
variety of plaintiffs and programs.  
 “How to inform the judicial mind,” Justice Frankfurter once com-
mented, “is one of the most complicated problems” confronting the 
Supreme Court.149 When it comes to nongeneralizable cases, this 
problem is acute. In explaining why this is so, this Article has high-
lighted limits in judicial factfinding. At the same time, by making 
use of a modified case management plan, the Court can arm itself 
with a robust information set. In so doing, it can play a meaningful 
and constructive role in shaping constitutional values in cases involv-
ing nongeneralizable facts. 
 
                                                                                                                    
 149. ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at 63 (Leon Friedman ed., 1983) (quoting Jus-
tice Frankfurter). 
 
